About 95% of global data and telecommunications is moved through fibre optic cables which are
laid on the ocean’s floor. The other 5% of traffic is largely transmitted through satellites, which are
usually more expensive, slower and without sufficient capacity to serve the existing demand.
Undersea (fibre optic) cables link the different continents, ensuring that internet connectivity is
flawless and accessible to all. According to TeleGeography (a telecommunications consulting firm),
there are currently, 552 fibre optic cables on the ocean floor, which make up a total length of 1.4
million kilometres, reaching 1444 cable landing stations (CLS), around the world. The connections
enable anyone in the world to access internet services such as Google (Gmail, YouTube, Google
search, etc), Facebook, Amazon, Netflix and various websites.
If anything wrong happens to some or most of the cables linking a particular area (for example,
Africa), that region will experience challenges with internet speeds and efficiency. In the worst-case,
the internet connection to any websites and web applications hosted (originating from) outside that
region will be totally cut-off. This is not an entirely new phenomenon, as cases abound when
internet in certain regions was disrupted or completely cut off due to such cable faults.
On the 8 th of August, 2023, for example, two subsea cables (WACS and SAT-3) were damaged on the
coast of West Africa. Resultantly, there was a degradation in internet efficiency and speeds in both
West Africa and Southern Africa, including SA. The disruption (slow internet speeds) lasted through
the whole month and internet observer, NetBlocks, confirmed the same. If a third cable had been
damaged in that same period, the disruption would have been severe. By early September,
connectivity had improved as the only authorised cable repair ship on the continent (named the
Léon Thévenin) had reached the site of the fault and done repairs.
In other cases, the breaking of a single internet cable can lead to slower internet around the whole
world. For instance, in October 2022, a cable was cut near the coast of France and resulted in
significantly slower worldwide internet speeds, until it was repaired.
The effects of disruptions in internet connectivity to SA
As stated earlier, a situation where there is total loss of internet connectivity to the outside world,
is a possibility, in the case of significant damage to undersea cables. In such a situation, citizens will
not be able to access Facebook, WhatsApp, Google, Gmail, YouTube, etc. On the other hand,
businesses will not be able to perform their operations which depend on internet connectivity for
the completion of tasks. Consequently, this would translate into losses for those businesses.
Additionally, where healthcare depends on the internet or where there are self-driving cars, for
instance, the disruption can even result in the loss of life. Moreover, since governments use the
same cables to access the internet, their operations will also come to a halt.
This apocalyptic description, serves to show that, the internet has become an important foundation
for economic and social continuity in SA. It is clearly the same for the rest of the world also. Any
possibility of disruption, should therefore, be treated with the greatest urgency.
Furthermore, since SA shares subsea cables with much of SADC and other African coastal countries,
the demise of South African internet also equates to a lack of connectivity within some countries in
the region. Thus, the vulnerabilities of local undersea cables are also shared among regional
countries. This relatedness means that if the efforts to avert connectivity problems start from
within SA, they should ultimately be coordinated with the rest of the region, for the best results.
Are the cables sufficiently protected?
Unfortunately, undersea cables are increasingly vulnerable to attacks and malfunctioning. It is
essential to have them protected like other critical infrastructure, such as national power grids,
railway lines and road networks, in order to avert inexpressible costs, in case the worst happens.
The cables are exposed to a number of risks, some of which are outlined below.
Firstly, it is a widely shared concern, that the Nord Stream pipeline bombings of 26 September,
2022, have emboldened potential terrorists and saboteurs, who will be encouraged by the fact that
the bombers were not identified. Russia and the West have since been trading accusations
regarding the responsibility for the heinous act. Unlike on land, there are far less people in the seas,
at any given time and installing surveillance tools can be more difficult. This has added to the
vulnerability of the undersea cable infrastructure.
Secondly, fishermen and ships passing through the seas can also damage the cables. When an
anchor is dragged on the ocean floor or fishing equipment is cast down-below, both can snap the
cables and cause problems with connectivity.
Thirdly, information regarding the exact location of the cables is publicly available in order to
minimise disruptions from fishermen and passing ships. The fact that it is publicly available, exposes
the cables to potential terrorists and malicious state actors (such as belligerent foreign powers).
Moreover, the cables are not arranged in one place on the seabed. Instead, they criss-cross,
spreading out in a haphazard manner. This makes it harder to monitor them and ensure that they
are secure. Cable landing points where the different connections are grouped together, in the
coastal areas, are also not adequately protected.
On top of that, according to experts, the legal framework which governs the seas does not provide
enough clarity and authority on laws which govern the oceans. Available legislative frameworks
include; the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the 1884 Convention on the
Protection of Undersea Cables and the 1958 Convention on the High Sea. Under these laws, nations
have very limited abilities to penalize any entity which damages undersea cables, especially in the
high seas, which are regarded as belonging to no particular country. Also, some restrictions set out
by the laws do not apply in war times. This means that, Ukraine, for example, can damage Russian
internet cables or those belonging to Moscow’s allies, without facing legal repercussions.
Additionally, there are only a few ships which are dedicated to the maintenance and repairs of
these cables. In Sub-Saharan Africa, it is mainly one ship, the Léon Thévenin, which is responsible
for laying new cables and providing repairs. The situation is also the same in the UK, USA, and other
developed economies, which also have a limited number of ships responsible for managing undersea
cables.
Furthermore, there is the growing concern that some countries have now developed technologies
which enable cyberattacks (hacking, tapping, etc) through undersea cables. To show the gravity of
such matters, in 2018, Australia blocked the Chinese technology firm, Huawei, from building a cable
which connects Australia to the Solomon Islands. This was for fear that the infrastructure would
give the Chinese an entry point into Australian networks.
Addressing the risks
The first stage in addressing the vulnerability of the subsea cables is, creating awareness regarding
the risks. Information campaigns should particularly target policy-makers. When government
officials do not understand what is at stake, the challenges will persist. In this regard, officials from
the Internet Service Providers Association (ISPA) and ICASA may need to brief parliamentarians and
cabinet on the importance of addressing the safety of sea cables. Thereafter, SA’s government
officials can discuss with regional peers in SADC. This may subsequently result in an African Union
(AU) policy which improves the safety of the cables. Ultimately, other advanced economies (in the
northern hemisphere) can also emulate such strategies. The collaborations will also provide an
opportunity for upgrading and strengthening the legal framework pertaining to the seas.
At some point, each African nation will need to contribute funds and personnel which will be
committed towards the safety (monitoring and inspection) of subsea cables which are on Africa’s
coast. Cable landing sites, some of which are inland, will also need to be fortified by adequate
human protection. Finances for additional cable repair ships can also be contributed at the
continental level. An availability of more repair ships implies that, when there is a fault with one of
the cables, it will be rectified swiftly.
The submarine cables may also be placed in a single zone, instead of their current haphazard
distribution. The bundling makes it easier for them to be monitored.
Governments can also push for all undersea cables to be turned into “dark cables”. This means that
the information on the location of the cables will no longer be publicly available on maps and
navigation systems. Rather, only the respective governments and the private owners of the cables
will know where they are. This helps through deterring potential malicious actors.
Plans on how to respond to a total internet disconnection, before it occurs, will also prove useful. In
this regard, regional governments may choose to increase the capacities of their satellite systems.
To add to that, government transactions should be disengaged from dependence on international
internet connectivity, as much as possible. This means that even in the worst-case, government
operations can still continue, without disruption.
Preparation is therefore important, instead of waiting to respond when faults or attacks occur.
Planning for negative scenarios and broadcasting planned responses before problems arise, will be
crucial.
Kevin Tutani is a political economy analyst- tutanikevin@gmail.com
Leave a Reply